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Summary:
This paper argues that a strong growth orientation has pervaded the organizational
literature in our society since World War II. However, as we enter an Era of Scarcity
a greater number of organizations will experience decline, and hence the study of decline
becomes critical. After discussing the concept of decline and its . treatment at the
organizational population level in the literature, the bulk of the paper focuses on the
sources, responses and effects of decline. Four sources of decline are discussed:
atrophy, vulnerability, loss of legitimacy, and environmental entropy. Next, four
generic responses to decline are reviewed: defending, responding, preventing, and
generating. Differences in the prevailing responses in public and private organizations
are discussed, as well as the difference between prescriptions of how organizations
should respond and descriptions of how they actually respond. Finally, the effects of
decline on morale, stress, turnover, conflict and innovation are discussed.
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Managing declining organizations and coping with the consequences
of retrenchment are pressing societal problems. Evidence of decline is
pervasive. Schools are cutting back due to decreasing enrollments, in-
dustry is laying off record numbers in response to recessionary pressures;
the military had to scale down its operations after Viet Nam; many churches
have been forced to close their doors due to lack of support; and municipal
services are being curtailed as a result of declining revenues. The con-
sequences of decline are far reaching. Families suffer the effects of un-
employment and the morale of the remaining workers deteriorates as they
are forced to fight over smaller and smaller resource pools. When an en-
tire industry retrenches the effects are felt society-wide. For example,
the displacement of 30 million farm workers due to increased mechanization
in agriculture is claimed by some to represent the genesis of our contem-
porary urban problems (Boulding, 1974)
.
So alarming are the potential consequences of wide-spread organiza-
tional decline that several scholars have proposed radically new forms
of government and commerce to meet this impending crisis (Benveniste,
1977; Heilbronner, 1976; Commoner, 1976). Whether or not these proposals
will be adopted, it is clear that our society is ill prepared to cope
with decline. Since World War II our country has enjoyed unprecedented
growth, and as Kenneth Boulding (1974) has noted, all our institutions
have become adapted to survival under conditions of rapid growth. The
need to adapt to emerging conditions of scarcity represents a significant
challenge at the individual, organizational, and professional levels.
At the individual level, decline runs counter to our strong success
ethic. During this country's golden era of abundance the values of
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optimism and self assurance have reigned unchallenged (Sutton, et al,
1956) . The ease with which people are able to live in an expanding
economy encourages an ego centered orientation (Fox, 1967) . With few
threats to collective interests, individuals are free to pursue personal
accomplishment. However, under conditions of munificence, ease is
confused with effort, and success with accomplishment. During this age
of The Power of Positive Thinking (Peale, 1952) , when we are instructed
to Think and Grow Rich (Hill, 1967) , it is the norm to ascribe success
to personal accomplishment. The dark side of this philosophy that suc-
cess can be willed, is that it implies failure reflects personal incom-
petence. This logical trap is also reflected in the tendency to treat
organizational growth as evidence of youth and vitality, since decline
then becomes equated with old age and senility. So powerful is the as-
sociation between growth and success, and decline and failure, in our
society that Scott (1976) has proposed that the chief issue in the man-
agement of declining organizations is not whether managers are capable,
but instead, whether they are willing. The best hands are generally the
first to abandon a sinking ship, and it is difficult to sign on a new
crew for a ship that is taking on water (Argenti, 1976; Hirschman, 1970).
To illustrate the extent to which the success ethic is engrained in
our culture, when individuals must discuss a failure experience they tend
to describe it as though it were a personal success. Personal credit is
taken for being: perceptive enough to recognize that a marriage partner
was ruining our life; capable enough to keep a business from losing any
more than it did before we had sense enough to bail out; so ethical,
smart, or experienced that our former boss felt threatened by our pres-
ence in the organization.
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At the organizational level, during a period of economic expansion
there are more organizational births than deaths, and more growth than
decline. For example, between 1950 and 1975 there were 2.2 million busi-
ness starts and only 100,000 deaths (Statistical Abstract, 1976). During
a period of rapid expansion, decline and death are discomforting anomolies
that are explained away as examples of failure to properly implement
fundamental management principles. Because growth has been the norm
in our country for decades, the experiences of managers in declining
organizations have not been widely documented (Smith, 1963) . As a
consequence, as we enter a period of economic slow down during which
a larger number of organizations will experience decline, their managers
have relatively few precedents or guidelines to rely on (Bogue, 1972)
.
Recognizing this problem, Boulding (1974) has called for the establishment
of clearing houses to facilitate the exchange of ideas and suggestions
between managers coping with decline.
At the professional level, organization behavior teachers and re-
searchers are ill-prepared to provide the necessary support services for
administrators in declining organizations because the field is dominated
by a growth paradigm (Scott, 1974, Whetten, 1979c). For example, few
courses are taught on management in declining organizations or under
crisis conditions. Further, many of the models used to teach adminis-
tration assume conditions of expansion. For example, a typical textbook
discussion of conflict management instructs students to resolve conflicts
over resource allocation by formulating a "win-win" alternative. When
munificence prevails this is a realistic prescription, since offers of
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side payments or promises of larger portions in the future can be made.
However, when the total resource pie is shrinking the win-win option
becomes less plausible since current losses are not likely to be made
up in future allocations.
Organizational research has also been dominated by studies on growth
related topics. The work of Blau and his associates (Blau, 1968, 1970;
Blau and Schoenherr, 1971) dealt primarily with the problem of maintain-
ing coordination in an expanding organization. This line of research
spawned numerous studies on administrative ratios (Pondy, 1969; Rushing,
1967; Indik, 1964), and the relationship between control strategies
and other organizational properties, such as, innovation (Hage and Aiken,
1967), and professionalization (Hall, 1968). While interest in this
line of research has wanned, the growth oriented paradigm it represented
remains strong (Benson, 1977; Kotter and Sathe, 1978).
A strong growth orientation is also reflected in the organizational
development literature (Greiner, 1972) . One of the most frequently stated
reasons for an 0D intervention is that workers are alienated due to the
negative effects of increasing organizational size. The use of profit
centers, inter-department integrators, team building, and humanistic
leadership practices represent attempts to infuse an intimate, supportive,
and tractable environment into large, complex organizations.
While our society as a whole is ill-prepared to cope with wide-
spread decline, we have little option (Boulding, 1973; Daly, 1973, 1977).
The industrial complex has been forced to cut back in response to double
digit inflation and an aroused public's concern about the rapid depletion
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of our natural resources (Schumacher, 1973; Commoner, 1976; Meadows, et
al, 1972); educational institutions have been forced to retrench due to
declining enrollments (Trow, 1975; Green, 1974; Cartter, 1970); and
government's legitimacy and resource base have been eroded by a taxpayers'
revolt over poor services and high taxes (Smith and Hague, 1971; Dvorin
and Simmons, 1972; Whetten, 1979b, Fenno, 1966).
The purpose of this paper is to call attention to the need for a
large scale examination of organizational decline. Twenty years ago
growth was recognized as an organizational crisis and a monumental
research program was initiated in response. The growith process has
now become routinized and decline is replacing it as a pressing organi-
zational concern. Decline actually warrants considerably more research
than growth, since its effect on the organization and society are more
profound, its causes are more obscure, and management has greater
difficulty responding to it.
To facilitate this substantial undertaking we will first examine
the concept of decline, and then review the highly diverse literature
relating to this topic. Our overall objective is to surface important
researchable issues.
Decline as a Concept
The word decline has two principal meanings in the organizational
literature. First, it is used to denote a cut back in the size of work
force, profits, budget, clients, etc. This reflects the case where an
organization's command over environmental resources is reduced either
as the result of decreased competitive advantage, i.e., reduced market
share, or decreased environmental munificence, i.e., the total market
shrinks. A decrease in market share might reflect poor management, but
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a shrinking market generally does not. The erosion of an inner city's
tax base due to white flight, a decrease in a school district's enroll-
ment, or the availability of oil during the embargo of 1972 all reflect
drastic changes in environmental munificence which are beyond the con-
trol of a city department, school superintendent, or gasoline retailer.
The best that an organization can do under these conditions is to antici-
pate a down-turn and buffer the production technology from its effects
by stockpiling raw materials, diversifying services or product lines, or
expanding into recession resistent markets. The object is to reduce the
element of crisis in decline through the use of forecasting techniques,
diversification, and contingency plans for rationing (Thompson, 1967).
Decline is also used to describe the general climate, or orientation,
in an organization. Using a life cycles model some authors speak of
mature organizations becoming stagnant, bureaucratic, and passive, as
evidenced by their insensitivity to new product developments, workers'
interests, and customers' preferences. This condition of deterioration
may or may not result in a loss of revenues. One of the traditional
arguments against monopolistic markets is that they allow firms to be-
come stagnant without experiencing serious repercussions. Similar ob-
servations have been made about the consequences of a lack of competi-
tion in the public sector (Roessner, 1979). Kolarska and Aldrich (1978),
Ansoff (1970), and Cyert and March (19b3) argue that under competitive
conditions a decline in revenues triggers a revitalization cycle in the
organization.
It is important to note that decline-as-stagnation does not neces-
sarily imply an absolute decrease in income whereas decline-as-cut back
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does. Stagnation is more often reflected as a decrease in the rate of
increase, rather than as an actual decrease. This distinction is useful
because it highlights the fact that it is decline-as-cut back, not stag-
nation, that is the emerging crisis ushered in by as era of scarcity.
The problem of stagnating organizations has been around for generations,
and is actually less likely to occur during periods of scarcity since
the two forms of decline are activated by opposing environmental condi-
tions. Stagnation is more likely to occur during periods of abundance,
whereas cut back is more likely during times of scarcity. The focus
of this paper will be primarily on cut back.
The Literature on Organizational Decline
The literature related to organizational decline is very broad and
diverse. Unfortunately very little of this material reports empirical
research. Instead the literature is dominated by case study descriptions
of declining organizations, arm chair analyses of the causes of decline
based on reviews of published case studies, and prescriptive guidelines
for preventing, or coping with, decline. In the literature, decline
has been examined at two levels of analysis: within a population of
organizations, and in individual organizations. Conceptual and empirical
work focused at each level will be discussed in turn.
Population Level
The dominant theoretical orientation in this area is the natural
selection model (Aldrich, 1974; Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; Campbell,
1969; Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Its principal components are three
ecological processes which proponents argue occur in all biological and
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sociological populations. These processes, or stages, are variation,
selection, and retention. In a population of organizations variation
in member characteristics occurs due to either planned or unplanned
actions. Consequently, the model does not require the assumption of
administrative rationality, or intentionality. Applications of this
model have tended to overlook the historical development of variations
and concentrated primarily on their effect on survival. The second
stage, selection, reflects a differential rate of survival within a
population. As certain variations are reinforced by the environment,
some members develop a superior competitive advantage. The retention
stage signifies that certain positively valued characteristics have
been preserved, duplicated, or reproduced in the population. Thus,
the focus of the natural selection model is primarily on the birth
rate (rather than the death rate as many suppose) of a mutant strain
(Stebbins, 1965). The competitive advantage of a species does not
appear suddenly in one generation, instead it emerges gradually over
several generations as the number of its members possessing a posi-
tively valued characteristic increases geometrically.
This model has been strongly advocated by Kaufman (1975, 1973) and
sharply challenged by Penrose (1952) . Kaufman argues that most models
of organizational processes are overly rational, "Our pride in personal
accomplishment seems exaggerated." He reasons that the evolutionary
model explains all that can be treated by rational models, plus a great
deal more. In critiquing rational models he asks, "Why do some organ-
izations adhere to practices that caused others to die? Why isn't the
world filled with old organizations? Why don't organizations with the
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smartest people always survive the longest?" (1975:144-45) In rebuttal,
Penrose argues that the evolutionary model is too deterministic. For
example, she attacks the naivete reflected in "variability analysis" in
economics which assumes that the firm with the highest profits will be
selected by the environment. She argues that attempts, such as this,
to extrapolate from biology to sociology overlook the emergent character-
istic of purposive behavior in human populations. The fact that many
organizations develop considerable expertise in forcing their environ-
ments to adapt to them is not considered in the evolutionary model.
While several other authors have noted the difficulties of apply-
ing the natural selection model literally to the study of organizations
(Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; Weick, 1969; Aldrich, 1979; Stebbins, 1965;
Child, 1972) it is clearly a useful heuristic device for analyzing
changes in the composition of a population of organizations over time.
Examples of research using this approach include Nielsen and Hannan
(1977), Aldrich and Reiss (1976), Freeman and Hannan (1975), and Hannan
and Freeman (1978)
.
There are several researchable questions emerging from this liter-
ature which warrant further investigation. We will examine two. First,
"What organizational characteristics will enhance adaptability to the
environmental conditions anticipated in the future?" This question re-
presents the heart of the organizational growth/decline issue. In order
to understand the growth and decline processes one must first understand
the conditions which determine the more fundamental states of survival
and death.
-10-
There is an extensive body of literature predicting future envir-
onmental conditions. Some futurists have argued that our pluralistic,
decentralized, capitalistic system is doomed. As it becomes more and
more evident that contemporary institutions are unable to respond
adequately to the increasing turbulence and complexity of their envir-
onment, they will be replaced with centralized planning and a socialist
economy which fosters a more equalitarian distribution of increasingly
scarce resources (Heilbronner, 1976; Commoner, 1976). Others, on the
other hand, have proposed that the present trend towards increased
complexity and centralization will eventually be checked because it is
antithetical to the American spirit. As a result, there will be even
greater emphasis placed on individualistic enterprise and mediating
structures. (Miles, 1976; Berger and Neuhaus, 1977). However, in
general it is assumed that organizations in the future will be located
in turbulent, centralized, and highly complex environments (Bennis,
1966; Vacca, 1973; Kaufman, 1973; Chadwick, 1977; Ansoff, 1965).
There has been considerably more disagreement over the ideal organ-
izational characteristics for these environmental conditions. There is
clearly not unanimous agreement regarding the characteristics which will
be selected out by the anticipated turbulent and complex environmental
conditions in the future. The most widely discussed organizational
characteristics are size, age, auspice, internal control, and structural
complexity. These have been included in many cross sectional organi-
zational studies and lend themselves to a population ecology study.
Some have argued that large size and old age are liabilities under these
conditions. As an organization increases in size and age it tends to
become more bureaucratic and inefficient; it is more difficult to change
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quickly; it makes more enemies as it encroaches on a greater number of
sacred domains; it becomes a larger target for militants and regulators
alike; and it has fewer options for expansion as it reaches the maximum
share of its markets allowed by law (Rubin, 1979; Bennis and Slater,
1968). Others have argued that small, young organizations will have the
greatest difficulty surviving since they are inexperienced; the conse-
quences of a bad decision, or a sudden downturn in the economy are
intensified due to a lack of buffering slack resources; and the negative
effects of interpersonal conflict are more difficult to contain (Stinchcomb,
1965; Levine, 1978; Kaufman, 1975; Boswell, 1973; Perrow, 1969). There
is also considerable disagreement over the advantages of centralization
vs. decentralization in turbulent environments. Burns and Stalker (1961),
Aldrich (1978) and Porter and Olsen (1976) have argued in favor of de-
centralization. For example, Porter and Olsen maintain that a generalist
in an outpost office is more responsive to changing environmental condi-
tions than a specialist in a centralized headquarters. On the other
hand, Hawley and Rogers (1974), Yarmolinsky (1975) and Rubin (1979) have
countered that decentralization can immobilize a system facing a turbu-
lent environment. Yarmolinsky uses the term "institutional paralysis"
to describe the university's inability to change, because no single
interest group has sufficient power to alter the organization's course.
There is considerably more agreement about the adaptive value of
loose coupling. This concept addresses the extent to which units in an
organization must interact with one another in order to perform their
systemic functions is a more fundamental structural characteristic.
While loose coupling is generally associated with decentralization,
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there is a difference between the two concepts. Generally, when we
think in terms of centralization/decentralization we are treating the
organization as an integrated whole. The parts of the organization are
assumed to be working in concert towards common objectives, and the
extent to which power is delegated is an indication of the number of
people involved in making strategic plans for reaching these objectives.
A decoupled system is quite different. Its components share a low level
of interdependence, as illustrated by Thompson's (1967) concept of pooled
interdependence. A business conglomerate is an example of this concept
since each subsidiary has the power to select product lines, adjust prices,
and alter its operating structure, as long as these decisions do not ad-
versely affect profits. Several authors have argued that this type of
institutional structure facilitates long term adaptability (Weick, 1976;
Aldrich, 1979; Glassman, 1973). Not only is this structural configura-
tion highly flexible, and therefore responsive, but in addition, the
freedom given each unit to respond to its unique environment tends to
produce a large pool of internal variety over time. This diversity
makes the organization robust since it is not adversely affected by
changes in one sector of its environment (Ashby, 1956; Hedberg et al.,
1976; Rubin, 1979). The principal liability of this design is that it
is extremely difficult for the organization as a whole to make purposive
coordinated changes, if that becomes necessary. The operating units
strongly resist the usurption of their autonomy and their response to
programs initiated by the central office varies from foot dragging to
defiant opposition. Hence, a loosely coupled structure is best suited
for organizations whose units do not need to respond to environmental
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changes in unison. The institutional paralysis in the face of massive
environmental change, spoken of by Yarmolinsky, results when an organi-
zation consisting of sequentially or reciprocally interdependent parts
(Thompson, 1967) adopts the structure of a holding company primarily
because this design is compatible with the institution's values of
autonomy and self governance. If the Chemistry department in a univer-
sity begins to think of itself as the ABC Widget Company in a large
conglomerate, the university has lost any chance of mustering a coor-
dinated response to declining environmental resources.
There is also considerable agreement regarding the effect of auspices
on organizational responsiveness. Many authors have noted the lack of in-
centives for innovation in the public sector. Rainey et al. (1976) have
identified several key differences between public and private organiza-
tions. Public organizations have less market exposure, more environmental
constraints, and more political influences affecting internal operations.
As a result, these organizations are marked by: more complex and contra-
dictory goals, less autonomy, less delegation of authority, more turnover,
greater difficulty in linking individual performance with incentives,
lower overall worker satisfaction and commitment, and greater variation
in member characteristics and abilities. Drucker (1974) has proposed
that the key difference between public and private organizations which
influences their incentive to innovate is the "mode of payment". Public
organizations are rewarded by a budget increase, while private organiza-
tions are rewarded by satisfied customers and repeat business. Roessner
(1979) attributes the lower number of innovations in public organizations
to the fact that innovations in the private sector are stimulated by
-14-
production efficiency while innovations in the public sector are moti-
vated by bureaucratic self interest (Yin, 1978) . The trend towards
"third sector" organizations, e.g., the U.S. Postal Servic, reflects
efforts by the federal government to make key public service organiza-
tions more responsive to market conditions.
The fact that the field does not totally agree on the constellation
of organizational characteristics which enhances adaptability in turbu-
lent and complex environments signals a strong need for further research
in this area. While a number of empirical studies have tested various
contingency theories of organizational design (Pennings, 1975; Dewar and
Webel, 1979) this line of research has been flawed by a lack of longi-
tudinal data. While business failure studies typically examine the per-
formance of a large subject pool over time, unfortunately these studies
generally rely exclusively on secondary data (Brough, 1969; Altman,
1971) . Consequently, their analyses tend to not be very rich or insight-
ful. While these studies are nicely complemented by several published
case studies of the collapse of notable business enterprises (Smith,
1963; Birchfield, 1972; Daughen and Binzen, 1971), there remains a sub-
stantial need for more systematic research on the organizational char-
acteristics which foster adaptability. Populations of organizations
containing variance on the various salient organizational characteris-
tics identified by Hedberg et al. (1976), Argenti (1976) and others
should be identified and studied over time to determine whether they
indeed predict organizational performance. The alternative societal
conditions predicted for the future can be identified on a micro scale
today and a study of the survival rates of various organizational
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configurations under these conditions could be conducted. Another pos-
sibility for this type of research is to simulate various types of en-
vironmental conditions in a laboratory setting building on the work
of Miles and Randolph (1979) and McCaskey (1974)
.
A second population level research question is, "What effect does
decline in one organization have on other members of a population?"
While this is not an ecological question it is related to populations.
This question is prompted by the work of Aiken and Hage (1968) . They
proposed that organizations respond to scarcity by establishing joint
programs to distribute the costs of innovation. In their model, staff
members propose more innovations than an organization can fund. To make
up the difference, other organizations are invited to co-sponsor new
ventures. It is logical to assume that when resources shrink this pro-
cess will increase. Since one of the consequences of joint programs is
that it increases the couplings between members of a population, the
effect of only a few members of a population needing to retrench is to
make the entire network richly joined. As a result, the network becomes
less stable, less flexible, and hence, less adaptable (Weick, 1976;
Aldrich, 1979). A study is currently underway to test whether this de-
ductive model can be verified in populations containing declining organi-
zations (Whetten, 1979a).
Organizational Level
While organizational decline has, to some extent, been examined at
the population level, most of the literature has used the organization
as the unit of analysis. While the intent of population ecology studies
is to identify gross organizational characteristics that predict survival,
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the research focus at this level is on internal processes. The research
question shifts from, "Which members of the organizational population
at Time 1 were present at Time 2?", to, "What is happening in these or-
ganizations as they experience and react to the changing conditions be-
tween Time 1 and Time 2?" While the first question is analogous to
a biologist's study of changes in a gene pool over generations, the
second question has no analogue in biology since it focuses on the
purposive actions unique to social systems. The first examines struc-
tural configurations, the second examines the structure generating
processes. The first is conducted by a diagnostician who makes infer-
ences about what is inside based on surface conditions; the second is
conducted by an anatomist who examines internal conditions directly.
The theoretical perspective most commonly used in this type of or-
ganizational research is the resource dependence model (Yuchtman and
Seashore, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976)
which is closely related to the political economy model (Walmsley and
Zald, 1973; Benson, 1975). These models assume that managers make
strategic decisions based on their assessment of the political and
economic conditions in their environment. Specifically, they take ac-
tions to maintain adequate supplies of political legitimacy and economic
resources.
Writers in this area tend to emphasize that organizations are
either passive reactors, or aggressive initiators, in their intercourse
with the environment. This ideological split carries over to the study
of decline. Some, such as Boulding, profess an organizational life cycle
theory which includes an "inexorable and irreversible movement towards
-17-
the equilibrium of death. Individual, family, firm, nation, and civili-
zation all follow the same grim law, and the history of any organism is
strikingly reminiscent of the rise and fall of populations on the road
to extinction..." (1950, p. 38). (See also Downs, 1967). The "success
breeds failure" and "failure stimulates further failure" organizational
decline models which will be discussed later reflect this fatalistic
philosophy (Starbuck et al., 1978; Argenti, 1976). A more optimistic
view of decline is reflected in the work of Ansoff (1970) and Cyert and
March (1963) . These authors present a homeostatic model in which a de-
cline in profits (or slack resources) triggers corrective actions to
increase profits. While we are far from the point of being able to make
a definitive statement about the utility of these two models, the field
is gradually accumulating enough case studies of decline that a descrip-
tion of the contextual conditions under which each is likely to predom-
inate is not far off. A review of these studies shows that they tend
to emphasize either the source of decline, an organization's response
to decline, or the effects of decline on other organizational activities.
Works addressing these three topics will be discussed in turn.
Sources of Decline
The sources of crises, which if responded to improperly precipitate
organizational decline, can originate from within an organization (Greiner,
1972), or more frequently, from the environment (Scott, 1976). Some
authors have focused on the sources of crises as though they were objec-
tive phenomenon (Balderston, 1972), while others have argued that the
real source of a crisis is in the misperceptions of organizational mem-
bers (Starbuck et al., 1978). A useful typology must therefore accom-
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modate both orientations. The typology proposed by Levine (1978) in
Figure 1 meets this requirement since it examines both internal and ex-
ternal causes. However, some modifications are needed to extend it
beyond the public sector for which it was designed. Levine' s four
categories are organizational atrophy, political vulnerability, problem
depletion, and environmental entrophy. A modified model also appro-
priate for business organizations consists of: organizational atrophy,
vulnerability, loss of legitimacy, and environmental entrophy.
Insert Figure 1 here
Organizational Atrophy . The consequences of organizations losing
muscle tone is a recurring theme in the literature. A recent formulation
of this argument has appeared in the work of Hedberg, Starbuck, Nystrom,
and their associates, as the "success breeds failure" syndrome. Follow-
ing the logic of Cyert and March (1963) they argue that organizations
formulate heuristic programs for dealing with recurring problems. Un-
fortunately, "because situations appear equivalent as long as they can
be handled by the same programs, programs remain in use after the sit-
uations they fit have faded away." (Starbuck and Hedberg, 1977). This
produces the often maligned phenomena of organizational inertia (Behn,
1977; Cyert, 1978). Organizations that habitually use programs based
on their previous utility tend to become desensitized to environmental
change. As a result, organizations which were the most successful in
the past become the most vulnerable to failure in the future.
While a decrease in responsiveness is generally associated with
senility, in organizations it is not confined to the aged. The debili-
-19-
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Figure 1: Levine's Model of the Causes
of Public Organization Decline
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tating effects of success can occur at any age. Tornedon and Boddewyn
(1974) in their study of divestiture found a common pattern of young,
aggressive, companies generating high profits which prompted the acqui-
sition of overseas subsidiaries—often before the establishment of a
policy for long term overseas growth. Because of this topsy turvy growth
pattern prompted by mercurial success, it later became necessary to
divest many of these acquisitions as changing business conditions made
it apparent that the organization had overextended itself. This sawtooth
cycle of rapid growth followed by drastic retrenchment is common, and
documents the fact that for organizations, as with humans, the incidence
of death is not perfectly correlated with poor health or old age. For
example, Altman (1971) reports that in 1970 over 279 million-dollar
firms went broke. Further, in terms of age, he reports that one third
of bankrupt businesses were less than three years old, 53% were younger
than five, and 23% were over ten. (Surprisingly only 2% of the failures
were less than one year old.)
Argenti (1976) has identified three patterns of organizational de-
cline. These are shown in Figure 2. Patterns #2 and #3 illustrate the
different varieties of the "success breeds failure" syndrome we have
discussed. In pattern #3 an organization has established an excellent
performance record. It is a major producer in its industry and highly
regarded as a solid on-going business concern—as exemplified by Penn
Central and Rolls-Royce. At the point of initial decline the company
has lost touch "....with their market or their customers or their em-
ployees. ... (hence) ... .although a major change has occurred no adequate
response has been made. Perhaps two competitors have merged but the
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chief executive has decided 'it won't affect us'. Or the company has
had its first strike which the board dismisses as being 'one of those
things' when in fact it is a sign that they have lost touch with the
shop floor." (Argenti, 1976, p. 162). This pattern reflects the classic
case of a large, old, organization deluded by the myth of invulnerability.
It confuses the achievement of age with immortality (being immune to the
travails of this life). As Argenti notes, this smugness precipitates
a slow but very painful death.
Insert Figure 2 here
The second trajectory of decline illustrates the risk of mercurial
success. In this case, rapid growth is followed by a precipitous decline
because managers are intoxicated with success and become careless. Typi-
cally this type of organization is formed by a charismatic entreprenuer
afflicted with the Midas touch. Unfortunately, counsel to level off the
organization onto a steady state plateau is dismissed. This illustrates
the extreme case of a growth oriented business ideology, as reflected in
the refrain, "Beyond the clouds lie the stars. Beyond the stars lies
the Great Absurd." (Argenti, 1976:159). This problem appears to be age
old. It is reflected in Jethro's counsel to Moses (Exodus 18:13-26),
and was discussed by Webber (1947) as the need to routinize charisma.
In his study of English public schools Pettigrew (1979) found that the
most critical phase in the organization's life cycle was at the peak
of its early growth curve. At this point the entreprenuer-founder of
those organizations which continued to be successful resigned and ap-
pointed a "manager" who could solidify his/her gains and initiate the
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mundane rules, and coordination mechanisms required for continued
development. The organization declined if the entrepreneur stayed
too long.
It is apparent that neither slow nor fast growing organizations
are immune to decline, although the two types of organizations face
different problems. The fast growing organization is experienced
in handling crises (Kotter and Sathe, 1978), so it has already
established elaborate problem solving routines. This organization's
vulnerability to decline lies in adequate problem recognition—rather
than inadequate problem response. Having had little experience with
this type of problem the organization is likely to discount symptoms
of impending decline. On the other hand, slow growing organizations
tend to be very sensitive to changes in their vital signs. Hence,
their vulnerability to decline is not in problem recognition but in
problem response. These organizations have so little slack that they
may not be able to survive long enough to respond to the problem.
Vulnerability . The second source of organizational decline is
vulnerability. In his classic work on life cycles, Stinchcomb (1965)
noted that organizations are particularly vulnerable in their infancy.
During this time they must overcome the "liabilities of newness".
Some of these are: temporary inefficiency due to inexperience, fre-
quent interpersonal conflicts resulting from distrust, and the lack
of a stable set of ties to customers, suppliers and regulators. The
difficulty young organizations have clearing these initial hurdles is
reflected in the death rate statistics for businesses reported above.
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From these it appears that "infant mortality is more common than sen-
ility" (Argenti, 1967, p. 7). The first decline trajectory in Figure 2
highlights the vulnerability of young organizations. The problems
caused by the inexperience of youth illustrate the "failure breeds
further failure" form of decline. Argenti notes that business organi-
zations which just never seem to get moving are typically formed by a
person with a technical orientation, e.g., engineer, architect, or
accountant.
In the public sector, political vulnerability is reflected in an
agency's inability to resist budget decrements. Levine (1978) dis-
cusses some of the factors which contribute to vulnerability—most
notably youth. "Small size, internal conflict, and changes in leader-
ship, for example, seem less telling than the lack of a base of exper-
tise or the absence of a positive self-image and history of excellence.
However, an organization's age may be the most accurate predictor of
bureaucratic vulnerability. Contrary to biological reasoning, aged
organizations are more flexible than young organizations and therefore
rarely die or even shrink very much." The postulated negative corre-
lations between age and vulnerability is supported by Kaufman's (1976)
study of turnover in federal agencies. During the period of 1923 to
1973 he found that newly established agencies had the highest death
rate.
The fragility of a public institution's base of political support
has been discussed by Mitnick (1978) and Shefter (1977). Shefter out-
lines a three stage model of municipal government fiscal crisis. First,
a social group (such as the unions in New York City) gains considerable
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power and demands a larger share of the public benefits. Second, the
government agrees to the demands either because the group is too power-
ful to fight, or because it is a natural ally. Third, the government
is too weak to finance these new claims by cutting benefits to other
groups or by raising taxes. This disparity then triggers a political
crisis which typically results in new government leadership.
Loss of Legitimacy . Benson (1975) has stressed the importance
of legitmacy as an organizational resource and noted the propensity
in some organizations to overemphasize the acquisition of economic
resources and overlook the value of cultivating political acceptance.
This is especially salient in the public sector. Rothman (1972) has
linked the rise and fall of various criminal justice programs with
shifts in societal ideology. As the prevailing views shifted from
incarceration to rehabilitation, for example, organizations which
embodied these values gained or lost public funding support. Levine
(1978) has noted that problem depletion is a major cause of loss of
legitimacy. Once the problem for which an agency was organized has
been resolved this should presumably lead to the termination of the
agency. However, Behn (1977) provides several interesting examples
of the unrealistic optimism of this conclusion. For instance, the
Temporary Commission of Investigation of the State of New York has
recently issued its sixteenth annual report. The Federal Metal and
Non-Metallic Mine Safety Board of Review was abolished only after its
executive secretary confessed in a front-page interview that he had no
work. The ability of an agency, or program, to establish a powerful
constituency which allows it to function independent of its enabling
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constitution makes it extremely difficult to terminate what appear to
be anachronous organizations. This fact is reflected in the poor
track record of presidents who have attempted to overhaul the execu-
tive branch, despite the sage counsel of astute political and admini-
strative advisors (Brown, 1977). Reflecting on this problem, Bardach
(1976) and Biller (1976) lament that in general founders of new public
programs do their job of institution building too well. As a conse-
quence, it is extremely difficult to dismantle an agency. Behn (1976)
argues that supporters of an existing organization have the upper hand
in a debate over the fate of a facility because their examples of spe-
cific problems that would result from a termination order (e.g., "Ten
clients would have to travel 200 miles to receive comparable life
sustaining treatments") are more compelling than the opponents' vague
complaints about inefficiency or ineffectiveness. Hence, while loss
of legitimacy is a potential source of decline and termination, it is
one of the environmental threats many organizations are remarkably
capable of deflecting.
Environmental Entrophy . The fourth source of decline stems from
the reduced capacity of the environment to support an organization.
Cyert (1978) has proposed that organizations in this situation have
basically two options: 1. They can find another ecological niche, or,
2. They can scale down their operation. In the literature, the first
(proactive) alternative has been emphasized by business authors while
the second (reactive) alternative has been discussed primarily in the
public and educational administration fields. The second group views
the management of a declining organization as unfortunate victims of
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circumstances , while the first group shows little sympathy for a crisis
ridden management who they regard as having neither the vision or the
will to initiate the innovations necessary to reverse the downward
spiral of decline. Exemplifying the business orientation, Starbuck and
Hedberg (1977), Ross and Kami (1973) and Barmash (1973) all argue that
an organization's presence is in a stagnating environment says more
about the organization's management than about the capacity of the
environment. Barmash introduces his study of 15 corporate disasters
with a clear statement of this orientation, "Corporations are managed
by men; and men, never forget, manage corporations to suit themselves.
Thus corporate calamities are calamities created by men." Hall's
(1976) analysis of the demise of the Saturday Evening Post supports
this position inasmuch as he noted that the egos of top administrators
clouded their judgment at critical points in the magazine's life cycle.
On the other hand, work done in municipal public finance (Muller,
1975; Clark et al, 1976) and university administration (Green, 1974;
Furniss, 1974; Trow, 1975) tends to emphasize the passive retrenchment
option. This literature assumes that public organizations are captives
of their environments—tethered to declining enrollments and eroding
tax bases. This orientation is reflected in Behn's (1978) recommen-
dation that public organizations adopt a matrix design so that expend-
able programs can be cut back easily when retrenchment becomes
necessary.
While this dichotomy in the public and private sector literatures
certainly reflects the fact that businesses have considerably more
flexibility in changing their goals, product lines, etc., it also
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appears to reflect a different orientation regarding organization/
environment relations in public and private organizations. Glassberg
(1978), Boulding (1975), Cyert (1978), Millett (1977), and Molotch
(1976) have all argued that one of the greatest needs in the public
sector is for a new cadre of leaders who will aggressively respond to
declining resources. This suggests a promising topic for research.
The process of sense making in organizations has been discussed by
Weick (1969, 1977a) and Pondy (1977), but little research has been con-
ducted. The causal mapping work by Bougon et al (1977) holds promise
and needs to be greatly expanded. Organizational members' beliefs
regarding the sources of crises provides a rich setting for extending
this pioneering work. Since the definition of a problem influences
the potential solutions considered, it would be interesting to explore
the possibility of institutional paradigms (i.e., world views in edu-
cation, penology, city government, business, etc.) that cause members
in different types of organizations to construct highly predictable,
but institutionally different, causal explanations for decline. The
work reviewed here suggests the existence of these paradigm grounded
causal maps, but few attempts have been made to systematically study
this phenomenon within a comparative perspective.
A related research topic is the practice of denying the existence
of a crisis. Why do some administrators respond quickly to the first
signs of decline while others explain them away? In his study of
school districts experiencing declining enrollments, Rodekohr (1974)
found that several superintendents refused to accept the validity of
data showing a decline in enrollment. In some cases this response was
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the result of the short tenure of the administrator, but in other
instances the superintendent was apparently simply not computing this
threatening information. "Creative accounting" is a related defense
mechanism identified in several case studies of business failures
(Argenti, 1976). In some cases business managers deliberately hide
negative financial data so as to not alarm stock holders and bankers,
but in other cases managers simply will not accept the implications of
the negative information conveyed by doomsayers and they juggle the
accounting record till it supports what they are sure is a more
accurate (and considerably more optimistic) reflection of the orga-
nization's health.
Response to Decline
After managers have acknowledged a crisis situation and con-
structed a causal map for making sense out of it, a response is for-
mulated. The literature on management responses to decline can be
best organized around the central issue of attitude towards change.
Figure 3 shows a continuum from "Change positively valued" to "Change
negatively valued." The categories "Generating," "Responding,"
"Defending," and "Preventing," highlight important benchmarks along
this dimension. Unlike the typical organization/environment relations
typology, this one does not range from reactive to proactive
(Thompson, 1967). Instead, the two extreme categories are proactive
2
strategies while the center two are reactive responses. Inasmuch as
most of the decline literature is couched in a responsive framework
the reactive categories will be discussed first.
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Insert Figure 3 Here
Defending . The defending response to impending decline is typically
found in highly bureaucratic settings, or in ideologically based insti-
tutions. Merton's (1957) classic work on the bureaucratic mentality
proposed that members of large (and typically governmental) organiza-
tions tend to undergo a psychological means-end shift over time. That
is, adhering to the organization's rules and procedures becomes more
important than fulfilling the objectives for which the rules were
originally created. In this context members will likely respond to
a proposed budget cut by defending the efficiency of the organization
and the diligence of its members (Whetten, 1979b; Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978). In an ideologically based organization, such as a
mental health facility, members are geared to defend the integrity of
the institution. Hence, they will likely react to a proposed budget
cut by arguing that the government "ought" to maintain their commit-
ment to the social values embodied in the mission of the threatened
organization (Hirchman, 1970). This is illustrated in the case of a
drug rehabilitation center in New York City which had a recidivism
rate of 100%. When the city officials attempted to close the facility
political supporters accused the city of dropping its commitment to drug
rehabilitation. As a result the officials felt compelled to continue
funding the program even though it was not fulfilling its intended pur-
pose (Roessner, 1979). Thus, while the ideologist defends his/her
organization by pointing out the symbolic political and social impli-
cations of a cutback, the bureaucrat uses facts and figures to
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demonstrate that his/her organization does not deserve to be cut back
because its members have been both diligent and frugal.
Responding . The responding mode has been discussed extensively
in the public administration literature. Zald and Ash (1966) and
Brouillette and Quarantilli (1971) have proposed models for predicting
responses to decline. Levine (1978) has critiqued the common approaches
to retrenchment, e.g., across the board cuts, cuts based on performance,
lay-offs based on seniority. Mitnick (1978) outlined five steps for
an agency responding to threatened termination. Furniss (1974) , Smart
and Vertinsky (1977), and Starbuck et al (1978) propose that a special
decision making task force be formed to address issues of decline.
They recommend that this "crisis corps" rely primarily on informal
power and communication channels. This group would determine the
severity of the crisis, present alternative courses of action, and in
general prepare the organization to "weather out the storm." Boulding
(1975) has called for the establishment of an "invisible college"
between administrative officials in educational institutions to facil-
itate the exchange of lessons learned in responding to declining
revenues and enrollments. To complement this informal network, a
cadre of consultants who specialize in the management of declining
organizations would be extremely useful. These people would be called
into organizations in shock much like Red Adair is called into oil
fields on fire.
An outside observer is particularly helpful under times of stress
since they can help management avoid the common mistakes of "solving the
wrong problem" and "attaching the wrong solution to the right problem"
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(Cohen, et al, 1972). The first error is exemplified by the tendency
to solve symptoms rather than underlying problems. Under crisis con-
ditions managers prefer quick responses. An agreeable solution, even
for the wrong problem, relieves tension and gives management the satis-
faction of achieving success in the face of failure. Unfortunately, the
true problem continues to grow and surfaces later as a calamity. A
classic example of this management fallacy was depicted in the recent
film "China Syndrome". After a malfunction at a nuclear power genera-
tor management thought they had found the cause, but overlooked evi-
dence of more fundamental problems which nearly resulted in an ecolog-
ical catastrophy.
The common error of "attaching the wrong solution to the right
problem" in managing municipal financial crises and university decline
has been noted by Glassberg (1978), Cyert (1978), Wildavsky (1964), and
Cyert and March (1963). Their concern is based on theoretical work in
the area of decision making. Wildavsky (1964) argues that decision
makers tend to make incremental responses, because "men cannot ration-
ally choose between alternatives drastically different from present
reality." Cyert and March (1963) describe a similar tendency called
problemistic search, i.e., people tend to search for solutions in the
area closest to the problem. It appears that this tendency increases
as a function of stress (Smart and Vertinsky, 1977; Bozeman and Slusher,
1979). Glassberg (1978) argues that one of the most common mistakes in
handling municipal fiscal crises is that public officials propose
incremental solutions for quantum problems. In his study of the decline
of the Saturday Evening Post
,
Hall (1976) found that problemistic search
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was one of the factors which precipitated the decline spiral. Between
1944 and 1946 the number of subscribers increased substantially. This
in turn greatly increased production costs which led to a decline in
the profit margin. Management's response was to increase the cost of
a subscription which had the effect of drastically cutting back the
number of subscribers. This decision initiated a period of stagnation
and eventual decline.
The defense and response reactions described in this section have
been discussed as though they are mutually exclusive decisions. In
practice they are often linked together to form a more complex response
pattern. In his analysis of the decline of civilizations, Toynbee (1947)
noted that the initial response of a society to the threat of an invader
is to retrench to traditional values. However, if the threat intensifies
then the victim tends to capitulate and embrace wholeheartedly the
culture of the aggressors. The willingness to accept the bad aspects of
the invaders culture along with the good, eventually leads to the de-
generation of the host society.
Preventing . A great deal has been written about organizations'
deliberate efforts to manipulate their environments to increase their
competitive advantage and to remove potential threats (Hedberg, et al,
1976; Perrow, 1979; Penrose, 1952; Post, 1978; Galbraith, 1971).
Tactics used include price fixing and other illegal practices (Staw
and Szwajkowski, 1975), acquisitions (Pfeffer, 1972; Markham, 1973),
buying political influence (Perrow, 1972), changing public opinion
and influencing consumer preferences (Post, 1978), and shaping
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economic and social policy (Sethi, 1977; Post, 1978). The logic in-
voked in describing these practices is that organizations act to avoid
uncertainty. Hence, administrators act to prevent the need for respon-
sive change (as opposed to self-initiated change). The skill of
managers using these tactics is illustrated by an interview with one
of John D. Rockefeller's sons. Asked if his father had ever broken
any laws in building his immense oil empire, the son responded that he
could not think of any laws broken by his father but he could name
several that were enacted because of him. The extent to which busi-
nesses should be restrained (either by conscience or regulation) from
engaging in practices that reduce the need for responsive change,
while producing significant harmful side effects for others, is at the
heart of the current debate over corporate social responsibility
(Marris, 1974; Preston and Post, 1975; Walton, 1977).
Generating . The polar opposite attitude towards change is reflected
by writers in the generating category. While the literature in the pre-
vious three categories was based on descriptions of current business
practices, the writers in this category tend to be academics who en-
courage businessmen to turn about and embrace the enemy—responsive
change. Relying on case studies of organizations which suffered sub-
stantial losses because they were too slow to respond, these authors
argue in favor of "self designing organizations." These organizations
are characterized by experimentation, informal communication lines,
slack resources, loose performance evaluation criteria, tolerance for
occasional failure, ad hoc jobs, frequent movement of personnel within
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and between organizations, and most of all, a high incidence of inno-
vation (Hedberg, et al, 1977; 1976; Starbuck, et al, 1978; Weick, 1977b;
Staw, 1977; Bennis and Slater, 1968; Toffler, 1970; Landau, 1973).
Further, Hedberg, et al, (1976) argue that these organizations should
look more like collapsible tents than stone palaces. That is, they
should be characterized by minimal consensus, minimal contentment,
minimal affluence, minimal faith, minimal consistency, and minimal
rationality.
In reflecting on this literature one is struck by the telling
differences between the descriptive and prescriptive work on this
topic. Managers are described as being skilled at rigging the environ-
ment to prevent the need for change, slow in responding to unpredicted
changes, inclined to select well used solutions to problems, and dis-
posed to think of innovation only in terms of incremental changes in
current practices. On the other hand, these writers warn managers
that these practices will not be positively selected by the environ-
ments of tomorrow. This discrepancy reinforces the need for more eco-
logical studies of organizations attempting to survive under different
environmental conditions. There is also a need for further theoreti-
cal development of the self design orientation. The logical adequacy
of this approach has been questioned by Wildavsky (1972) and Bozeman
and Slusher (1978). In addition to responding to these criticisms,
proponents need to give more consideration to the organizational and
societal implications of the wide-spread adoption of their model. The
prospect of managers, stock holders, workers, government regulators,
and supporting social institutions all positively reinforcing frequent
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and significant innovations in production organizations suggests the
possibility of a run away innovation cycle which would have serious
deleterious effects. There must be some negative loops built into
the model to serve as a homeostatic mechanism and so far insuffi-
cient attention has focused on this matter. It is also questionable
whether organizations have the capacity to become self designing.
This model suggests a level of rationality which organizations may
simply not be capable of achieving, especially during times of crisis
when the need to self design is greatest . The work of March and Simon
(1958), Cyert and March (1963), Cohen et al (1972), Rubin (1977),
Benveniste (1977), and Smart and Vertinsky (1977) suggest that this is
indeed the case. This conclusion is illustrated in the following
account from Forrester's (1971) "Counterintuitive Behavior of Social
Systems.
"
"Our first insights into complex social systems came
from our corporate work. Time after time we have
gone into a corporation which is having severe and
well-known difficulties. The difficulties can be
major and obvious such as a falling market share,
low profitability or instability of employment....
Generally speaking we find that people perceive
correctly their immediate environment. .. .In a
troubled company, people are usually trying in good
conscience and to the best of their abilities to
solve the major difficulties. Policies are being
followed at the various points in the organization
on the presumption that they will alleviate the
difficulties. One can combine these policies into
a computer model to show the consequences of how
the policies interact with one another. In many
instances it then emerges that the known policies
describe a system which actually causes the troubles.
In other words, the known and intended practices of
the organization are fully sufficient to create the
difficulty, regardless of what happens outside the
company or in the marketplace. In fact, a downward
spiral develops in which the presumed solution makes
the difficulty worse and thereby causes redoubling
of the presumed solution." (p. 55)
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This observation underscores the need for the self design propo-
nents to reconcile the incongruity between their prescriptions and the
natural tendency for administrators under stress to reflexively select
contrary responses. The fact that this incongruity exists is not by
itself problematic, but the fact that it is hardly mentioned in the
self design literature is troubling. If managers under stress need to
behave contrary to their reflexive patterns, considerable reflection
and research will be required to discover methods for countering these
tendencies. Hence, the self design literature needs to move beyond
its prescriptive mode and come to grips with the knotty issues of
implementation, especially during periods of stress inducing decline.
Effects of Decline
A declining resource base has wide-spread effects. It affects the
state of mind and career patterns of the staff and the manner in which
business is conducted in the organization.
At the level of the individual organizational member, the most
profound effect of decline is increased stress. As slack resources
dwindle, the margin for error in an organization decreases. While the
stakes for making good decisions increase, the penalties for making
bad ones increase also. As the tension and pressure mounts, morale
tends to sag (Behn, 1978) and high turnover follows (Levine, 1979).
To alleviate turnover in declining organizations Levine (1979)
suggests new forms of compensation which make exit very costly (e.g.,
deferred payment schedules for fringe benefits like profit sharing and
retirement). A related consequence is increased interpersonal conflict.
In declining organizations more people find that they are losing more
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often with little prospect for making up current resource losses in
future allocations (Levine, 1978; Starbuck, et al, 1978). To alle-
viate these negative consequences Cyert (1978) proposes establishing
new goals and evaluation criteria early in the decline process as a
means of reducing uncertainty and increasing integration. Yetten
(1975) has argued for new leadership models adjusted for the stress
factor in crisis situations. In this vein, Glassberg (1978) has exa-
mined the leadership style of mayors which are most effective during
fiscal crises and Yetten (1975) and Levine (1979) both note that mana-
gers in decline conditions rely less on participative decision making
in order to avoid conflict.
This literature points out the need for research on the ability
of conventional theories about leadership, conflict resolution, deci-
sion making, and communication to explain behavior during the crisis
of retrenchment. Since they were typically developed and verified
using observations from expanding organizations, there is scarcely an
organizational model or theory which does not require recalibration
for conditions of decline.
One of the more disturbing effects of decline is that it tends to
penalize most those who can least afford it—and in some cases least
deserve it. This occurs both at the individual and organizational levels,
Generally, the first staff members to be dismissed during a period of
retrenchment are the low skilled, low income, minority (including women),
young, or very old. These are the people who will have the most dif-
ficulty absorbing the loss of wages and finding a new job (Levine,
1978). The organizational effect of this action is to decrease the
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intemal pool of variability within the organization and increase the
average age of the labor pool (Levine, 1979). When these effects of
involuntary discharges are coupled with the fact that those who choose
to leave the organization are those best qualified to formulate
creative responses, the overall effect of decline on personnel turnover
is to produce a "regression to the mean" effect in labor pool qualifi-
cations.
A similar phenomenon occurs at the departmental level. The most
common form of retrenchment is to distribute the cuts more or less
evenly across all units. This option is politically more feasible
than cutting off an entire program or department because it is less
3likely to be sharply contested. The consequence of this approach is
that a cut-back hurts those that deserve it the least, i.e., the most
efficient. A highly efficient unit has the greatest difficulty imple-
menting a retrenchment order since it has operated with less fat in
the past (Levine, 1979).
Another effect of decline is on the rate of organizational innova-
tion. While the literature suggests a strong relationship between
decline and innovation, the sign of the correlation is disputed. Some
authors have argued that decline will hamper innovation. For example,
Smart and Vertinsky (1977) and Bozeman and Slusher (1978) have pro-
posed that during crises managers are paralyzed by a fear of failure.
Hence, they become more conservative, rather than more innovative. In
the public sector this takes the form of trimming the fat from existing
programs, rather than exploring radically new service delivery alterna-
tives (Whetten, 1979b). On the other hand, Wilson (1972) has argued that
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organizations are not likely to adopt significant innovations until
they experience a major crisis. The regenerative benefits of crises
have also been stressed by Lindbloom (1968) and Glassberg (1978).
This lack, of consensus regarding the effect of decline on innova-
tion highlights again the incongruity between prescriptions for, and
descriptions of, the management of stressful situations. This obser-
vation underscores the pressing need for more research on decision
making under conditions of stress. One hypothesis that warrants
examination is that organizations follow the response pattern of
threatened nations, described by Toynbee (1947). A small amount of
stress may cause members to "clutch", i.e., to have their creative
faculties impaired by fear. However, as the threat increases in
intensity a threshold may be reached that triggers a desperate effort
to generate creative alternatives. This proposition is consistent
with Miller's "General Theory for the Behavioral Sciences." He argues
that all "living systems respond to continuously increasing stress
first by a lag in response, then by an overcompensatory response, and
finally by catastrophic collapse of the system" (1955:27). Miller's
three stage response model highlights a paradox of innovation. If we
first assume that the overcompensatory response of organization's
facing decline- induced- stress is the initiation of multiple innova-
tions as an act of desperation; then we can conclude that under cer-
tain conditions innovation actually contributes to a system's collapse.
Of course, not all innovations have this dysfunctional consequence,
but when they are initiated under conditions of stress it appears
highly probable that this unintended consequence will result.
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This conclusion points out the need for more research on the
effect of innovation on decline. While it is implied in the self-
design literature that a high level of innovation is associated with
high organizational performance, others have argued that the relation-
ship is curvilinear, i.e., either too little, or too much, innovation
leads to low performance (Smith, 1963; Argenti, 1976). This proposi-
tion is consistent with research on the effect of stress on individual
performance which has shown that performance is highest at an optimal
level of stress, i.e., the highest point on an inverted U curve
(Schuler, 1979).
The ultimate effect of decline is death—whether this is the
outcome of a deliberate effort to terminate an ineffective public
program, or the consequence of poor management in a small business.
While research on organizational death is beginning to emerge in the
literature (Kaufman, 1976; Hall, 1976; Aldrich and Reiss, 1976; Behn,
1976) it is hampered by a lack of consensus on what organizational
death represents. Does it occur when there is a change in the name of
the organization? When all its members are replaced? When the facil-
ity is moved? Does it make a difference if these events are the
result of a merger, as compared with a business failure? One of the
most difficult situations to classify is the case where a legal cor-
poration ceases to exist but its organizational operation continues to
function. In the business literature an organization is divided into
three tiers. The enterprise controls the economic assets, the mana-
gerial level controls human resources, and the firm directs the pro-
duction activity. In many mergers (and divestitures) there is no
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change at the firm or managerial levels—only the legal name of the
enterprise is changed. Similarly, in his study of federal agencies,
Kaufman (1976) found that the functions performed by a terminated
agency are often transferred to another agency.
Some clarity is achieved by distinguishing between death and
failure. A study of death examines whether an organization still
exists, a study of failure focuses on the causes of death. Organiza-
tional failure connotes total ineffectiveness due to managerial incom-
petence, political vulnerability, or environmental entrophy (Pfeffer
and Salancik, 1978). Hence, a failure would be considered a fatality
in an organizational decline study even if its staff and programs (or
products) are transferred to other organizations. In the business
sector, the event of organizational death due to failure is qualita-
tively very different from organizational death due to transformation,
as in the case of a merger. An organization that is acquired must by
definition have some marketable assets. The fact that it is purchased
indicates that it is currently successful or that it has the potential
for becoming such. While both types of organizational death present
interesting research issues, death due to failure is more closely
related to our interest in the organizational consequences of the
emerging era of scarcity.
Summary and Conclusions
The objectives of this paper were to bring together a diverse body
of literature relating to organizational decline, and to surface impor-
tant research topics in the process. We have discussed the concept of
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decline and examined the conceptual and empirical work related to this
topic at the population and organizational levels of analysis. At the
organizational level we examined the causes, responses to, and effects
of decline.
This review has surfaced two major dysjunctions in the literature.
First, authors addressing decline in the public sector tend to have a
different orientation than those writing about crises in business
organizations. In the business sector organizational death is viewed
as suicide—in the public sector it is treated as homocide. In the
private sector declining profits are regarded as evidence of stagnating
management, rather than environmental scarcity. Conversely, in the
public sector, decline tends to be viewed more as a characteristic of
the environment than of the organization. Hence, authors in this area
speak of cut back management as though it is the only option. In the
private sector this response is regarded as a last recourse—appropriate
only after all proactive strategies have failed. This discrepant orien-
tation reflects a difference in the level of autonomy in the two sec-
tors. Public administrators generally have less freedom to relocate
their organization to a new ecological niche. However, several authors
have noted that this is often more apparent than real, i.e.
,
public
administrators may have more degrees of freedom than they choose to
consider. Hence, the need for a more aggressive breed of public admini-
strators has been stressed. To facilitate this process, the needs for
more dialogue between business and public administrators, and mechanisms
for disseminating information about innovative options selected by
public administrators have been noted.
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Second, there is a significant discrepancy between descriptions of
how managers actually react to decline-induced-crises, and prescrip-
tions for how they should react. Under pressure managers tend to
become more conservative, rather than innovative; and more autocratic,
rather than participative. Advocates of a self-design approach to
organizational administration prescribe the opposite responses. In a
crisis situation, managers should examine a wide range of alternatives,
discredit past responses, and solicit extensive inputs from others.
The fact that there is a discrepancy between ideal and actual behavior
does not warrant concern. However, the fact that these prescribers generally
do not examine the feasibility of implementing their prescriptions
does. Consequently, there is a substantial need for research on orga-
nizational operations under crisis conditions to discover how innova-
tive alternatives can be substituted for reflex reactions—when they
are desirable. Further, to avoid the dysfunctional consequences of
innovation suggested by Miller's (1955) three stage model of response
to stress, we need more information on how managers can use innovation
as a strategy based on calculation, rather than desperation. In the
former case it is analogous to a rifle shot aimed at a specific target,
in the latter case it is like a shotgun blast searching for a target.
In general, there is a significant need for more interdisciplinary
research on responses to stress. Research previously conducted at the
physiological (Slye, 1976; Cooper and Marshall, 1976; Gal and Lazarus,
1975), psychological (McGrath, 1970; Levi, 1967), and organizational
(Sales, 1964; Colligan, et al. , 1977; House, 1974; Smart and Vertinsky,
1977) levels needs to be integrated and applied to decline as a spe-
cial case of stress.
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To complement this research on stress there is a considerable need
for case studies of organizational responses to decline. Especially
critical is information about the choice between alternative responses.
It is apparent that different options have been chosen by different
organizations but we have little data on the factors influencing this
choice process. In addition to longitudinal participant observations,
information on this topic can be collected from historical records of
organizations that have undergone retrenchment. Accounts of how single
organizations and entire industries have managed these situations pro-
vide a rich data base for the development of inductive models (Rubin,
1977; Smith, 1963).
Interdisciplinary research is especially important in assessing
the effects of decline. The decline of an organization can affect
organizational members' emotional health and morale, family stability,
inter-departmental relations, decision making procedures, community
labor market dynamics, and interorganizational relations. Research on
the likely effects of wide-spread decline in an era of scarcity might
produce radical reformulations of our theories of job design, employee
compensation, organizational design, career development, and leader-
ship. In addition, it might argue for new forms of government, com-
merce, and society. These and other challenging research frontiers lie
ahead.
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Footnotes
This typology includes a much wider range of causes than those pro-
posed in the business literature. For instance, Miller (1977) and
Argenti (1976) identify the following causes: impulsive decisions,
that overextend the organization's assets, not responding to change,
an executive that is either too powerful or poorly informed (absentee
owner), and taking unnecessary risks.
2
As an aside, after formulating this typology I was intrigued to
discover its similarity to a model of managerial response to stress
developed by Burgoyne (1975). His categories are avoidance, defense
mechanisms, learning. This typology is also similar to one proposed
by Miles et al (1974): Domain Defenders, Reluctant Reactors, Anxious
Analyzers, Enthusiastic Prospectors.
3
An interesting example of this occurred in the New York State Univer-
sity system. A few years ago when the higher education budget in that
state was cut significantly, most of the campus presidents chose to
distribute the cuts evenly across all departments. However, one pre-
sident distributed the reduced resource pool on the basis of past per-
formance, projections of the future enrollments by discipline, etc.
He initiated a massive evaluation of the campus programs and used the
outcomes as his criteria for allocation. Some programs were cut to
the bone while others were increased substantially. This action
created such a political uproar in the faculty, student body, alumni,
and interest groups linked with the gutted departments that he was
forced to leave the university shortly thereafter.
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